Ryanairs Corporate Culture

Ryanairs Corporate Culture 1. Summary This report attempts to analyse the corporate communication strategies currently employed by Irish budget airline Ryanair with respect to the various communication frameworks in place, whilst focusing on both external and internal stakeholders. Finally an analysis of Ryanairs corporate culture and HRM strategy with respect to their influence upon employees within the organisation. 2. Introduction Corporate communication distinguishes itself from other forms of communication such as management by the means in which it bases itself upon the organisations corporate perspective, the stakeholders it addresses and the management activities within its scope (Cornelissen, 2005) According to Argenti Foreman (2002) corporate communication can take the role of two forms; as a ‘function which may be dispersed across an organisation, or as a ‘process to reach all of its constituencies. An appropriate definition from Argenti (2002) avers Corporate Communication as â€Å"the corporations voice and the images it projects of itself on a world stage populated by its various audiences; corporate reputation, corporate advertising and advocacy, employee communications, investor relations, government relations, media management and crisis communications†. A consequence of these characteristics is that they are complex in nature especially when referring to multi-national organi sations (Cornelissen, 2005) such as Ryanair therefore effective communication strategies demand an integrated approach to communications management. Successful communication strategies clearly identify the organisations differentiating factor, or the profile which it wants to portray to its stakeholder groups. In the case of Ryanair its differentiating factor is its ability to consistently offer â€Å"lowest cost scheduled airline tickets† (Hagele, 2006). Micheal OLeary (CEO) says of his corporate strategy â€Å" Its the oldest, simplest formula; Pile‘ em high and sellem cheapWe want to be the Wal-Mart of the airline business. Nobody will beat us on price. EVER†. A powerful but contraversial message communicated by OLeary, which as the paper will discuss later synonmous with Ryanairs communications strategies. The objective of this paper is to identify what global communication framework/ s Ryanair are currently using; analysis of both internal and external corporate communication strategies and their subsequent impact with reference to engaging both internal and external stakeholders. Finally identification of Ryanairs corporate culture and its influence upon people within Ryanair. The aim of this paper therefore after discussing the objectives is to decide whether the frameworks and communication strategies Ryanair use are effective in maintaining their position as the European low-cost budget airline for both internal and external stakeholders. 3. Communication strategy Integrated Corporate Communication framework within Ryanair Corporate Communication as an integrated framework for managing communication (Cornelissen, 2005) Ryanair holistically combines both marketing, advertising, technology and public relations practitioners together in an integrated communications framework model (Cornelissen, 2005) drawing upon management strategy, consumer behaviour and organizational theory (see appendix) to manage the companys reputation and maintain brand equity. Integrated communication is created at the corporate brand level for Ryanair with the goal of enhancing its positioning within the market as Europes ‘lowest price airfares whilst maintaining its competitive strategy. Unlike other organisations that have placed corporate communications managers into executive teams (Cornelissen, 2005) OLeary does not follow this example, preferring instead to ‘council its head of corporate communications Stephen MacNamara and head of marketing Dara Brady, and rather instead maintaining control over Ryanairs communication strategy in its entirety. OLeary orchestrates Ryanairs communication strategy from the ma nagement team down with a hierarchical approach, enabling communication from a corporate strategic level which is reflected within its corporate culture. What makes Ryanair such a success is its inherent ability to consistently communicate the same ‘offering and its core strategy to stakeholders of ‘low price regardless of the ‘landscape it finds itself within. O Leary is able to leverage negative publicity associated with an event or incident at Ryanair and exploit this free opportunity to promote greater exposure of the brand and re-iterate how successful they really are. For example by utilising existing media channels such as an internet bloggers page who has posted a negative blog regards Ryanair, the companys integrated communication framework enables a quick response from MacNamara who instead re-enforces how successful their business model is in providing the cheapest fares around. What makes Ryanair unique within the airline industry is their ability not to waiver from their strategy of low cost, even if this means the ‘customer is not always right (O, Leary, 2007). This approach to communication strat egy is strengthened by the ‘Input-Output model of stakeholder management discussed later in the paper and shown in the appendix. 3.1. Internal Communications The organisation defines itself as a low-cost airline; the consequence of this is that unlike other airlines that can pass on additional cost increases to the customer such as increasing fuel prices Ryanair are unable to do so. Therefore their communication frameworks revolve around low-cost channels such as face-to-face, traditional print media and a heavy emphasis on technology and web-based communications system such as the Ryanair intranet, enabling employees such as flight crew, maintenance and ground staff, amongst others to access critical information and maintain quality management. Ryanair attempts to communicate with its employees (Annual Report, 2009) through a variety of communication channels; an internal staff newsletter called â€Å"The Limited Release† provides employees with up-to-date plans, issues and challenges within the aviation industry, where further daily news bulletins are broadcast on Ryanairs internal TV network. Additionally the organisations Employee Representative Committee (ERC) (one per department) liaises with Ryanairs European Works Council to provide guidance on current aviation issues pertinent to employees. Therefore using an integrated framework encompassing word-of- mouth, electronic channels, and periodical print media has enabled the organisation to minimise tangible costs. Only recently OLeary was quoted in the media for criticising employees for ‘stealing Ryanairs electricity by charging their mobile phones! (ref). 3.2. External communications As an entrepreneurial organisation Ryanair believes it possesses the right to play outside the box and follow its own path, challenging the status quo of corporate communication and pushing the aviation industry boundaries. As a result OLeary, MacNamara and Grady follow an external communications strategy which more often or not is designed to provoke the audience rather than to attract (see appendix). What is consistent is Ryanairs approach which is synonymous with ‘old school Public Relation strategy; in that it focuses on communicating the same message repeatedly; ‘low fares through online, print and . channels in an attempt to reinforce the notion of ‘good value with consumers. However, whilst it can be argued that this strategy may seem archaic it actually proffers the advantage that Ryanairs positioning strategy is absolutely clear to its stakeholders; in that its offering is ‘low priced airfares and absolutely nothing else. OLeary has a reputation as a hard-nosed businessman choosing his words carefully but with the intent to cause as much controversy as possible which ultimately creates a paradox of both artistic creativity and destruction. ‘Screw the share price, this is a fare war† â€Å"We bow down to nobody. Well stuff every one of them in Europe, we wont be second or third and saying: didnt we do well? In business, honesty is a dirty word. People say the customer is always right, but you know what theyre not, sometimes they are wrong and they need to be told so† (Michael O Leary, 2007) Using a provocative vocabulary ensures that during crisis management strategies in the event of negative publicity OLeary is able to leverage as much exposure as possible for Ryanair which ultimately leaves the company at the forefront of consumers minds. The most recent examples of these have been the (perhaps?) ‘faux-pas of Ryanair employee responses back to online bloggers regards disag reements in online content complaints about customer service (see appendix) 3.2.1 Values To complete 3.2.2. Key stakeholders According to (Johnson Scholes, 2008), organisational stakeholders are those individuals or groups who depend on the organisation to fulfil their own goals and on whom, in turn , the organisation depends. Furthermore (Wall Rees, 2004) and (Johnson Scholes, 2008) suggested that stakeholders are other societal groups who are affected by the activities of the firm and whom in turn, the organisation depends. This section identifies the major stakeholders of Ryan Air and how they are important to the firm however Ryanairs stakeholders encompass a wide range of groups which can be classified as both 1) societal 2) economic (organisational) with each group unique in their expectation as stakeholders of Ryanair. The former range from pressure groups, competitors, suppliers and customers, where for example customers are legally entitled to fair trading practices; differs from the latter (organizational) comprising of shareholders and employees, who are entitled to extra rights under the rul e of corporate governance. The model which aligns most closely within Ryanair for both internal and external stakeholders, if OLearys approach to corporate communications is followed is the ‘Input-Output model of strategic management (Cornelissen, 2005) (see appendix). This emphasises that power lies within the organisation, upon which other stakeholder groups are dependent in respect to their relationship with Ryanair; this is illustrated by OLearys clear disregard for stakeholder perception across all groups. Internal Stakeholders Employees within Ryanair are according to OLeary ‘a cost (2006) until they are able to contribute fully to the business, demonstrated by the corporate culture of reducing overheads by externally sourcing cabin crew and making new employees pay for their training with the organisation until fully qualified and an ‘asset to the company. Further to this a compensations structure following the premise of ‘pay on the basis of transactions undertaken; meaning sectors flown (Mayer, 2008) ensures that cabin crew absorb a lot of the cost impact to delayed flights creating an incentive through commission to market other Ryanair products. Further to this the absence of any trade union or regulatory body at the request of O Leary ensures that whilst these stakeholders are ruled under ‘fair corporate governance they are seen to be disposable commodities. External Stakeholders -to complete Unlike more conventional stakeholder models OLeary does not apportion importance to external governmental or regulatory influences rather choosing instead to challenge them .i.e. the European Union over competition policy in 2006 (ref) and British airport accusations over ‘unfair charging practices over recent years. This strengthens the notion that the ‘Input-Output model of stakeholder management is correct; in reference to the power lying ‘within Ryanair rather than with its stakeholders. However effective communication is a key success factor of this organisation is respect to its approach of its relationship with new airports. MacNamara uses a tactic which involves generating awareness of potential new routes by announcing instead the new jobs it will create and the anticipated increase in volume of passengers Suppliers bargaining power for fuel is high, medium for aircraft and medium low for airports; sourcing, purchasing and procurement is done face-to-face negotiation like most b2b business. 3.2.3 Corporate Culture, brand, image and identity Corporate Culture Melewar (2006), corporate culture is impacted by history of the company, the founder of the organization and country of origin of the organization. There is link between corporate culture and corporate history because the interaction among the group can develop culture. Melewar (2006) stated that the founder of the company can affect the corporate culture The corporate culture of Ryanair is very much influenced by OLeary, strengthening the notion that the CEO can dictate the corporate culture of the airline. Schein (1992) posits culture to be â€Å"accumulated shared learning of a given group, covering behavioural, emotional and cognitive elements of a group members total psychological functioning† addressing a shared understanding of culture; contrasting with Johnson and Scholes (2002) who aver that â€Å"the basic assumption and beliefs that are shared by members of an organisation, that operate unconsciously and define in a basic taken for-granted fashion an organisations view of itself and its environment† addressing instead repeated behavioural patterns. When attempting to analyse Ryanairs corporate culture the former analogy becomes more prominent. Ryanair corporate culture is more focus as an airline company based in Ireland, representing the Irish culture: Organise, reliable, and kindly (Ryanair.com, 2009). Corporate brand Balmer (1995), corporate brand refer to corporate reputation, corporate image and concern on perception. It focus on all internal and external stakeholders, and boarder mix than traditional marketing mix, and it require commitment from all staff, senior management as well as financial support. From Balmer (2001), the favorable corporate brand came from organizational identity. Ryanair brand core is the ‘low cost flights for all. This brand core is applied to focus on the cost of Ryanair brand which is available at different levels for differents types of customers (Ryanair.com, 2009). It also emphasizes on the promise that the brand communicate to the stakeholders. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the communication depends on the gab between the performance and promise although in Ryanair we see more students, leisure people than business people. Nevertheless people from any background can afford to use the service. Corporate image Abratt (1989), Grunig (1993), and Van Riel (1995), there are three approached of corporate image which include psychology, graphic design and public relation. From Balmer (2001), the corporate image came from managing business identity. Moreover, corporate image related to immediate mental perception to the organization held by individual group. Corporate identity Abratt (1989), Balmer (1998) Olin (1990) and Van Riel (1997), corporate identity focus on culture, strategy, structure, history, business activity and business scope. Corporate identity is the mix of elements which give the organization their distinctiveness. And the key questions are who are we, what are structure, strategy, business, reputation, performance, business and history. Ryanair corporate identity is based on ‘bleueness (The corporate colour): meaning they are ‘up for it, ‘passionate, ‘sharp ‘mad about safety and ‘mad about cost. Bleue is what make Ryanair different. 3.2.4 HRM Strategy -to complete 4. Conclusions To complete 5. Bibliography Abratt, R. (1989), â€Å"A new approach to the corporate image management process†, Journal of Marketing Management, 5(1), 63-76. Annual Report, Ryanair.com. (2009), ‘Annual report 2009, [Online] at: URL: http://www. Ryanair.com/ [Last accessed 22nd March 2010] Argenti, P. (2003) ‘Corporate Communication, 3rd edition; Mcgraw Hill Argenti,P. (2009) ‘Corporate Communication, 5th edition, McGraw- Hill Education. Balmer, J.M.T. (1995), â€Å"Corporate branding and connoisseurship†, Journal of General Management, 21(1), 24-46. Balmer, J.M.T. (1997), Corporate identity past, present and future, works paper, University of Strathclyde International Centre for Corporate Identity Studies, Glasgow. Balmer, J.M.T. (2001), â€Å"Corporate identity, corporate branding and corporate marketing: seeing through the frog, European Journal of Marketing, 35(3-4), 248-291. Cornelissen, J. (2005) ‘Corporate Communication, Theory practice; Sage Publications Davies, A. (2002) ‘Public relations Democracy Part 2; Guirham, M. (1999) ‘Communicating Across Cultures; McMillan Harris et al, (2003) ‘International HRM; CIPD Johnson, G; Scholes, K. (2002) ‘Exploring Corporate Strategy, Prentice Hall Mitchell, Aigle Wood. Johnson, G; Scholes, K; Whtittington, R. (2008) ‘Exploring Corporate Strategy, Prentice Hall Mitchell, Aigle Wood. Oliver S. (2001) ‘Corporate Communication; Kogan, Page Mayer, S. (2008) ‘RyanAir and its Low Cost Flights in Europe: Marketing Plan Akamdemische Schriftenriehe; GRIN Verlag Melewar, T.C. (2006) ‘Seven dimension of corporate identity: a categorization from practitioners perspective, European Journal of Marketing, 40(7/8), 846-69. Tourish D Hargie O. (2004) ‘Key issues in organisational Communication; Routledge Van Reil Cees.B.M. (1992) ‘Principles of corporate Communication; FT Prentice. Van Riel, C.B.M. and Balmer, J.M.T. (1997). â€Å"Corporate identity: the concept, its measurement and management†, European Journal of Marketing, 31(5-6), 340-350. Wall, S and Rees, B (2004) ‘International Business, 2nd Edition , Pearson Education Limited. 6. Appendix Proposed Stakeholder model with Ryanair Input Output Model of Strategic Management (Cornelissen, 2005) Ryanairs response to an Irish blogger Jason Roe who highlighted flaws over the website layout; rather than thanking Mr.Roe instead staff commented: (source: ‘ Ryanair calls blogger lunatic; The Telegraph, 25th February 2009)

Aviation management

How did Stansted get the go ahead to become London’s 3rd airport? Pursuits for expansion of London airport capacity have been long drawn involving various Airport Commissions and political intrigues (FT, 2014). The quest for the Third London Airport particularly with regard to competing proposals for a new airport at Cublington and the expansion of Stansted is the subject of this section, which also discusses the key players who took part in the process.. Capacity constraints at Heathrow, particularly with the rapid growth in air traffic in the 1950s, led to overflows into Gatwick, UK’s second airport. Neither of these two locations are however ideal given the growth of the city. Built-up areas are not conducive for air safety and there is the additional challenge of noise pollution impacting residents (Helsey and Codd, 2012). It became apparent in the 1960s that there was need to meet considerable growth anticipated into the future. This gave rise to proposals for a new airport and expansion of existing capacity. Stansted, a former military airfield in Essex, was proposed as a third airport in 1963 and was thereafter endorsed by a Government White Paper in 1967 (HC Hansard, 1971; Stansted Airport, 2013). A subsequent inconclusive public inquiry led to the setup of the Commission for the Third London Airport, popularly referred to as the Roskill Commission tasked with review of sites for a third airport (Abelson and Flowerdew, 1972; UKCAA, 2013). With its evaluation of the timing of need, the requirement for expansion of capacity, and after a careful study of a total of 80 proposed project sites, four sites were finally chosen, principal among them a new airport at Cublington in the Vale of Aylesbury. It was deemed to offer best access situated in the key London-Birmingham axis away from built-up areas and would cost less than most of the alternatives (Abelson and Flowerdew, 1972). This proposal however met with strong opposition from local people, politicians and middle-class voters making it politically untenable (FT , 2014). An influential member of the Roskill Commission, Colin Buchanan, in dissent on grounds of environmental and planning concerns, proposed a new alternative at Maplin Sands, Foulness in the Thames Estuary. This opened the door to strong political opposition against Cublington with the latter proposal becoming the preferred option of the Conservative government of the day which thus disregarded Roskill’s proposal (FT, 2014; Helsey and Codd, 2012; Mishan, 1970). Maplin had interestingly been considered by the Roskill Commission and had been decisively rejected on the basis of cost (the most expensive option overall), distance and convenience to prospective passengers (the most remote) (FT, 2014; Mayor of London, 2013). With all the political support and progress towards the Maplin proposal, it was not built (FT, 2014; Helsey and Codd, 2012). The cost of the constituent deep-harbour, rail links, motorways, new towns to accommodate workers, and surface route to the airport was an astronomical ?825 million (estimated at ?8,448 million today) (Helsey and Codd, 2012). To many, including the opposition party then – the Labour Party, this was regarded as unacceptable (FT, 2014). With the coming to power of the Labour Party a change in complexion, the Maplin airport project was abandoned in July 1974 (FT, 2014). A reappraisal of passenger projections in the new regime indicated â€Å"over-optimism† in forecasts showing that there was adequate capacity until 1990 at Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted and Luton, aided by regional airports (AOA, 2013; UKCAA, 2013). However, with increasing competition from abroad and passenger numbers once more rising, the need for expansion became apparent. British Airports Authority (BAA), owner of the Stansted Airport, submitted plans for its expansion and with significant lobbying by its Chairman Norman Payne and the enlisting of support from Margaret Thatcher, the Maplin scheme was abandoned in favour of a cheaper plan to enlarge Stansted (Mayor of London, 2013). This option had also been considered by Roskill and had not made the shortlist of key options (FT, 2014). The expansion of Stansted was accomplished a decade after its proposition but was a predictable failure challenged by a lack of success in attracting and supporting long-haul operations by airlines (World Airline Directory, 2001; UKCAA, 2013). It was however to benefit from the emergence of low-cost carriers, principally Ryanair, which were drawn by attractive landing charges which offset consequent inconvenience to their passengers (UKCAA, 2013; Mayor of London, 2013; BBC, 2011). Airport policy in the UK has been a case study of political short-termism with the location of an additional (3rd) airport for London in a dilemma. Heightened by uncertainy over demand and growth estimates and a general lack of bold political action, decisions are challenged by political considerations making inland airports unfeasible and economic cons iderations making coastal airports unfeasible. This has led to the postponement of requisite action with policy makers often prone to swaying given the intense and incessant lobbying and political pressures. References Abelson, P. and A., Flowerdew, 1972. Roskill’s successful recommendation.† In: Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Vol. 135. No. 4, pp.467 Airports Operators Association, 2013. The Airport Operator, Autumn 2013. BBC, 2011. Heathrow and Stansted runway plans scrapped by BAA, 24 May 2010. Viewed on 30/1/2014 from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk Financial Times, 2014. London’s new airport held to ransom by folly. December, 2013 House of Commons Hansard, 1971. Third London Airport (Roskill Commission Report). 4th March. Vol. 812. cc1912-2078. HC Helsey, M., and F., Codd, 2012. Aviation: proposals for an airport in the Thames estuary, 1945-2012. House of Commons Library. Viewed from: http://cambridgemba.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/sn4920-1946-2012-review.pdf Mayor of London, 2013. Why London needs a new hub airport. Transport for London. Viewed from: http://www.tfl.gov.uk/corporate/projectsandschemes/26576.aspx Mishan, E., 1970. What is wrong with RoskillLondon: Lo ndon School of Economics Stansted Airport, 2013. Press Release. Viewed on 1st Feb 2014 from: http://www.stanstedairport.com UKCAA, 2013. UK Airport Statistics – Aviation Intelligence. United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority. World Airline Directory, 2001. Flight International. Stansted Airport, Stansted, Essex, 27 March – 2 April 2001. CM241SB, UK Given the urgent need to find a solution to UK airport capacity why do you think the government wishes to delay the process? Political intrigues and myriad arguments still mire the London airport expansion pursuit half a century later with the current Howard Davies Airports Commission set up in 2012 still wading in the long running controversy (FT, 2014). Continued political posturing, hedging and stonewalling still characterizes this pursuit for a viable solution given the readiness to oppose policies espoused by those of different complexions and political stand and complication of issues hindering bold decisions and action (FT, 2014; CAPA, 2013). With reference to previous government airport policies, this section evaluates the desire of government to postpone a decision on the final solution to meet need until after the 2015 general election. In the Davies Commission’s view, the capacity challenge is yet to become critical and there is need for action as there is potential for it to be (The Independent, 2014; Airports Committee, 2013a). These findings contained in its December 2013 interim report (preceding a final report expected in 2015) are based on the acknowledgement of continued growth of air travel, mainly in the South East of England with the need for an extra runway by 2030 and another possibly by 2050. For the short and medium term, the Commission has made a raft of proposals to enhance efficiency of airline and ground operations (Airports Commission, 2013b). Ideally, the latter proposal is arguably most appropriate given that operational and design improvements have hitherto enable d the handling of more volumes than anticipated, extending current capacity and enabling full and efficient use of available resource (UKCAA, 2013; The Independent, 2014). On the Commission’s shortlist of options for the short and medium term include a third runwayand lengthening of an existing runway at Heathrow, and a new runway at Gatwick. The proposal for a brand new airport in the Thames Estuary is side-lined citing uncertainties and challenges surrounding it with the Commission however promising to evaluate its feasibility and to arrive at a decision regarding its viability later in 2014 as well as longer term expansion options at Stansted and Birmingham (CAPA, 2013; Airport International, 2012). The government however says that it will not make a final decision in this regard until after the 2015 general election pushing the responsibility to the next government (CAPA, 2013; FT, 2014). When the Coalition government came to power in 2010, it scrapped former Labour gover nment’s plan for a third runway at Heathrow to which it had been strongly opposed instead favouring the creation of a new hub airport in the Thames Estuary (Helsey and Codd, 2012). Given renewed focus on Heathrow, there seems to be a deliberate decision by government to avoid offending the electorate in its turnaround from its manifesto commitment, as well as to avoid political turbulence in the run up to the forthcoming elections (FT, 2014; CAPA, 2013). It is widely accepted that Prime Minister David Cameron set up the Davies Commission in a bid to postpone or to defuse controversy, maintaining a dishonest ambiguity until after the general election (FT, 2014). Heathrow is a popular preference given the support it receives from the majority of politicians (except those with constituencies on the flight path); business and powerful representative lobby bodies; airlines; air alliances; remote UK regional airports benefiting from international connections; as well as domestic an d international aviation representative bodies (CAPA, 2013; FT, 2014). Critics state that the inclusion of other airports is intended at making the proposals not to seem too Heathrow-centric and is aimed at political expediency (FT, 2014, CAPA, 2013). It would have been political dynamite for the Commission not to have made positive clamours with regard to runway capacity warding off accusations of ministers trying to kick the controversy ‘into the long grass’, a scenario which has bedevilled such pursuits for half a century (CAPA, 2013; The Independent, 2014). From the 1967 Government White Paper permitting the expansion of Stansted, through subsequent inquiries and the Roskill Commission in the early 1970s, the quest for expanded capacity continues with arguments going back and forth around similar proposals and sites (FT, 2014; UKCAA, 2013). Expansion at Heathrow is an easy road given that it is relatively cheaper and has less challenges but for the environmental con cerns of noise pollution and carbon emissions which cannot be ignored or wished away (Airports Committee, 2013a). The option for expansion at Stansted is impeded by previous capacity limitation by the 1985 White Paper, though it got reprieve in the 2003 ‘Future of Air Transport’ White Paper and an extension of passenger capacity limit by the courts (DOT, 2003). Yet, Stansted has historically been challenged with regard to its support of long-haul flights; preference by airlines; as well as environmental concerns (World Airline Directory, 2001; UKCAA, 2013). The Thames Estuary option despite being the most environmentally sound is challenged by economic considerations regarding not only the cost of building the airport but also the requisite surface links, and costs associated with imminent closure at Heathrow. There is also difficulty in the estimation of effects it will have on demand and airline operations (The Independent, 2014; Airports Commission, 2013b; Airport In ternational, 2012). This scenario highlights the present dilemma facing political players and government, which is what leads to their general uncertainty and a general lack of boldness in approach. Intense lobbying and political pressure has consequently led to the postponement of decisions and the backtracking by government from its pledge. The divide in opinion and arguments causing uncertainty hands politicians a license to continue to do nothing at all. References Airports Committee, 2013a. Emerging thinking: Aviation Capacity in the UK. 7th October. Viewed from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/aviation-capacity-in-the-uk-emerging-thinking Airports Commission, 2013b. Short and medium term options: proposals for making the best use of existing airport capacity. 7th August. Viewed from: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/short-and-medium-term-options-proposals-for-making-the-best-use-of-existing-airport-capacity Airport International, 2012. Thames Estuary Airport Is No t A â€Å"Short Term† Solution. 4 July 2012. CAPA, 2013. The Davies Commission’s Interim Report on UK airports: the big loser remains UK competitiveness. Centre for Aviation. Department of Transport, 2003. The Future of Air Transport – White Paper and the Civil Aviation Bill. Viewed on 14/1/2014 from: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dft.gov.uk/about/strategy/whitepapers Financial Times, 2014. London’s new airport held to ransom by folly. December, 2013 Helsey and Codd, 2012. Aviation: proposals for an airport in the Thames estuary, 1945-2012 The Independent, 2014. Sir Howard Davies’ Airports Commission: Air travel could be transformed within a few years – with no more ‘stacking’. 17th December, 2013 UKCAA, 2013. UK Airport Statistics – Aviation Intelligence. United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority.

Federalist vs. Anti-Federalist Essay - 844 Words

Federalist vs. Anti-Federalist The road to accepting the Constitution of the United States was neither easy nor predetermined. In fact during and after its drafting a wide-ranging debate was held between those who supported the Constitution, the Federalists, and those who were against it, the Anti-Federalists. The basis of this debate regarded the kind of government the Constitution was proposing, a centralized republic. Included in the debate over a centralized government were issues concerning the affect the Constitution would have on state power, the power of the different branches of government that the Constitution would create, and the issue of a standing army. One of the most important concerns of the†¦show more content†¦46, James Madison addresses these concerns about the well being of the state governments under the Constitution. Madison argues that the interests of the states will not be lost in Congress, because the loyalty of the legislator will be first to the people of his district and then secondly to the benefit of the whole country. Madison says that the members of the Federal Legislature will be likely to attach themselves too much to local objects(Madison 239). Madison tried to alleviate the concerns of the Anti-Federalist concerning what type of recourse the states would have against Federal legislation by saying that the states would have powerful means of opposition to any unfavorable or unwarranted legislation. The powerful means of opposition Madison talks about is the displeasure of the people, whom Madison believes to be the fountain from which the Federal government draws its power. The second major concern of the Anti-Federalists was the power of Congress. It worried the Anti-Federalists a great deal that the Constitution would grant Congress the power to tax in necessary and proper circumstances (Main 122). Not only could Congress pass new taxes without the consent of the people or state governments, the Anti-Federalist also felt that the Congress would have control over the judiciary branch. If Congress had influence over the judicial system, what recourse would the state have against unfair legislation? TheShow MoreRelatedThe Federalists Vs. The Anti Federalists1801 Words   |  8 PagesTheory vs. Reality The concept of theory versus reality is a constant in everyday life. Every person has experienced a situation in which the idea in their head was much better than the outcome. All actions have consequences, and sometimes those consequences are worse than others. In the case of the Federalists vs. The Anti-Federalists, was the drafting of the Constitution actually worth it in the end? 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Anti-Federalists insisted on protecting the rights of the states and theRead MoreEssay about The Federalists vs the Anti-federalists in Colonial America609 Words   |  3 Pagesgovernments adequate. The Anti-Federalists could not make an effective campaign against the Federalists because of their intellectual inability, political skills, and social class. Most of the opponents of the Constitution were often debtors, small farmers, ethnic minorities such as the Irish or German, most lived outside of communities and did not participate in large events this is one of the main reasons that they could not rally up all of their followers. The Anti-Federalists who lived rurally, wereRead MoreAnti Federalists Vs. Patrick Henry1555 Words   |  7 Pagesfrom Britain, there was a new sense of freedom and opinions on how the nation must need a republic and form a republic. An upcoming group called the Federalists will clash with the anti- federalists of what must the order of government should be involved with running the country. James Madison who was a federalists and Patrick Henry an Anti-federalists had both given strong opinions on a new Proposition, of taking charge and forming a co untry that will run fairly and not dominating as a monarch. ManyRead MoreAnti Federalists Vs. Federal Republicans Essay1766 Words   |  8 Pageshave been addressed sufficiently. These discussions and debates often took place between two specific groups, the Federalists, and their opponents who they termed the Anti-Federalists. However, these so-called Anti-Federalists would have referred to themselves as Democratic Republicans or Federal Republicans, so they will be referenced in this vein. On the side of the Federalists were men such as James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, George Washington, Gouverneur Morris, and other proponents of aRead MoreAnti Federalists Vs The Ratification Of The U.s. Constitution1074 Words   |  5 Pagesthe other hand, Anti-Federalists were against the ratification of the U.S. Constitution. Unlike the Federalists, many of the Anti-Federalists were not included in the deliberations on the new constitution; they were not selected as delegates to the constitutional convention. Anti-Federalists were in favor of a confederacy; a system where the central government exercises no control over subunit governments (i.e. states) and acts for the subunits. Therefore, their name, Anti-Federalists, is not a good

Analysis Of David Lynch s Mulholland Drive - 1367 Words

Regarded as one of the most important directors of our century, David Lynch, was born in 1946 in Missoula, Missouri. Lynch is also a screenwriter and producer and is one of the first to make surrealism popular. Through his critically acclaimed films like Elephant Man, Eraser Head and Blue Velvet, he earned his title as the first to make surrealism popular. Like any surrealist worth his salt, Lynch creates his own version of reality, with its own set of often unfathomable and inexplicably, but emotionally and psychologically resonant qualities. In his 2001 film, Mulholland Drive, a mystery film that tells the story of an aspiring actress named Betty, newly arrived in Los Angeles, who meets and becomes friends with an amnesiac woman, who†¦show more content†¦This in fact builds the atmosphere as vaguely disorienting, since the audience has no auditory cues to cling to before they are taken visually by the progression of events on the screen, and all other sounds and speech so und louder and starker against the silence. When a soundtrack is layered in, however, the music is often incongruous with the transpiring actions—for example, the orchestral music played as Betty exits LAX with the elderly couple strikes the listener as a very strange and eerie â€Å"aroma† with the strings’ long and mournful notes, and the jaunt and upbeat jazzy music that fills the air as Adam confronts and is thrown out of his house by his cheating wife seems inappropriate for the situation. Lynch’s auditory cues are proposed to further confuse the audience and to mislead them through the plot of Mulholland Drive, but his deceptiveness further allows deeper reflection. This is why Mulholland Drive is such a great example of a film to analyze because of David Lynch’s ability to really portray certain concepts and intentional film elements that are left up to individual interpretations. Much of Lynch’s directorial skills projected the film as a very highly regarded film. The arrangement of everything that appears in the framing – actors, lighting, dà ©cor, props, costume – is called mise-en-scà ¨ne, a French term that means â€Å"placing on stage.† The frame and camera work are alsoShow MoreRelatedAnalysis Of The Film The Basement Of The Grand Cafe Des Capucines Boulevard Paris 2404 Words   |  10 Pagesdreams, fantasies, delirium, are according to Freud direct manifestation to the Unconscious†. As we can see the connection between movie and psychoanalysis continuous for a long time, in my essay I will tray to introduce how American director David Lynch use this assumption in his movies. There is no exaggeration in American cinema theorist Charles Altman, (Altman, 1977: p.260-261) one who placed the thesis of a substantial change in the perception of the problems the film due to the expansionRead More The Destruction of Identity in Vertigo, The Tenant, Mulholland Drive2858 Words   |  12 PagesThe Destruction of Identity in Vertigo, The Tenant, Mulholland Drive The rudimentary form of narrative storytelling lends itself towards application to an individual subject’s life story due to the correspondence of a narrative’s finite bounds and the subject’s mortality. Vertigo (dir. Alfred Hitchcock, 1958), The Tenant (dir. Roman Polanski, 1976), and Mulholland Drive (dir. David Lynch, 2001) are consistent with this idea because their narratives follow an individual human subject from